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ABSTRACT 
International peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions’ evident failures have recently 
prompted a focus on the interaction between interventions and target societies and states. 
Especially popular has been the ‘hybridity’ approach, which understands forms of peace and 
governance emerging through the mixing of local and international agendas and institutions. 
This article argues that ‘hybridity’ is a highly problematic optic. Despite contrary claims, 
hybridity scholarship falsely dichotomises ‘local’ and ‘international’ ideal-typical 
assemblages, and incorrectly presents outcomes as stemming from conflict and 
accommodation between them.  Scholarship in political geography and state theory provides 
better tools for explaining PSBIs’ outcomes as reflecting socio-political contestation over 
power and resources. We theorise PSBIs as involving a politics of scale, where different 
social forces promote and resist alternative scales and modes of governance, depending on 
their interests and agendas.  Contestation between these forces, which may be located at 
different scales and involved in complex, tactical, multi-scalar alliances, explains the uneven 
outcomes of international intervention. We demonstrate this using a case study of East Timor, 
focusing on decentralisation and land policy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, international peace-promotion efforts have increasingly involved 
international ‘peacebuilding’ interventions. These have encompassed diverse activities, 
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including military intervention, public administration and economic reform, transitional 
justice and even the promotion of psychological healing. In the 1990s, Western governments 
and international organizations operated largely within a ‘liberal peace’ paradigm, assuming 
that stabilising ‘fragile’ and post-conflict states required rapid democratization and 
marketization (Paris, 2004). However, from the 2000s, as failures of implementation and 
outcome abounded, peacebuilding has increasingly been delivered through ‘statebuilding’. 
Statebuilding denotes a ‘broad range of programs and projects designed to build or strengthen 
the capacity of institutions, organisation and agencies – not all of which are necessarily part 
of the state apparatus – to effectively perform the functions associated with modern 
statehood’ (Hameiri, 2010: 2). Peacebuilding is thus frequently combined with statebuilding 
to reshape target societies, polities and economies towards more peaceful outcomes. These 
efforts, despite their often technocratic presentation, are inherently political, seeking to 
(re)allocate power and resources and shift political outcomes. Accordingly, they are 
frequently contested, as are their associated modes of governance.   
In many prominent cases, this contestation has led peacebuilding or statebuilding 
interventions (PSBIs) to fail to attain their governance objectives, or even to pacify target 
societies, prompting critical reflection among scholars and practitioners. In the 2000s, some 
began arguing that these failures reflected incompatibility between the liberal institutions 
interveners were promoting and target societies’ culture, norms and institutions, with 
resistance to defend local customs and authority undermining PSBIs (Richmond, 2005). This 
generated early recommendations for interveners to respect and incorporate local ‘paradigms’ 
into their projects (Chopra and Hohe, 2004). Policymakers have increasingly adopted this 
perspective, reflected in the turn to counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which involve cultivating alliances with tribal leaders to combat Islamist insurgents. 
Practitioners now prescribe modes of intervention that are more compatible with local values 
and institutions (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015). This ‘local turn’ has spurred closer 
scholarly attention to how interactions between international interventions and target societies 
shape PSBI outcomes.  
The core concept used here is ‘hybridity’. This essentially denotes the mixing of 
international/liberal and local/non-liberal agendas, ideas, institutions and authority structures.  
Reflecting different usages in peace studies, IR and development, the concept is used 
diversely, with both proscriptive and descriptive applications (Millar, 2014: 1). For many 
peacebuilding scholars, ‘hybridity’ is a normative project, used to critique ‘top-down’ 
interventions and advocate engagement with ‘local’, ‘everyday’, non-state-based identities, 
traditions and practices to achieve more ‘emancipatory’ outcomes (e.g. Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2015). For many statebuilding scholars, hybridity is used more descriptively, to 
explain the emergence of ‘hybridised’ political orders through often conflictual encounters 
between international interveners and local populations (e.g. Wallis, 2012). 
 This shift towards studying the crucial nexus between international intervention and 
local politics and governance was essential, since this is obviously where PSBI outcomes are 
determined. However, we argue that this scholarship, whether peace-based or state-based, has 
been constrained by the ‘hybridity’ concept. ‘Hybridity’ does not adequately describe 
international interventions’ effects on local politics, nor does it properly explain their uneven 
outcomes.2 Despite recent efforts at nuance, hybridity ultimately dichotomizes and reifies 
local-traditional and international-liberal ideal-typical assemblages of institutions, actors and 
practices. Conflicts between these binary assemblages are seen to generate ‘hybrid’ orders. 
This approach is descriptively inaccurate insofar as some ‘locals’ support some 
‘international’ PSBI agendas, while others resist. Nor do ‘internationals’ always promote 
‘liberal’ agendas while ‘locals’ favour ‘traditional’ ones. Although recognized by some 
hybridity scholars, these complex realities are impossible to address coherently within an 
inherently dichotomizing framework. Moreover, merely locating PSBI outcomes on a ‘local’-
‘international’ spectrum, as hybridity scholars do, does not explain why particular modes of 
governance emerge or whose interests they serve. 
Our alternative explanatory framework reconceptualizes the interaction between 
intervention and ‘local’ politics as a politics of scale. Scale, in political geography, refers to 
hierarchized social, political and economic territorial spaces, each denoting ‘the arena and 
moment, both discursively and materially, where sociospatial power relations are contested 
and compromises are negotiated and regulated’ (Swyngedouw, 1997: 140). Scale matters in 
PSBIs because interveners inevitably seek to reallocate power and resources among different 
scales, e.g. embedding international disciplines into a centralised national state (Hameiri, 
2010), or decentralising power to subnational, state-based or ‘traditional’ agencies 
(Hirblinger and Simons, 2015). Scales like ‘local’, ‘subnational’, ‘national’ or ‘global’ are not 
neutral; they involve particular configurations of actors, resources and political opportunity 
structures that always favour some forces and agendas over others (Gough, 2004). Thus, 
PSBIs are not contested simply because ‘locals’ reject ‘international’ actors’ ‘liberal’ and 
‘modern’ agendas, but because social groups favour different scalar arrangements in line with 
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their interests and agendas (Smith, 2003). What emerges is not simply to be described as a 
local-international ‘hybrid’, but must be explained as stemming from contestation over scaled 
modes of governance by socio-political forces located at diverse scales, potentially in tactical, 
multi-scalar alliances. 
The remainder of this article describes and critiques the hybridity literature; outlines 
our alternative framework; and applies it to a case study of East Timor. 
 
HYBRIDITY’S LIMITS 
This section describes and critiques the hybridity literature. We focus on its inherent tendency 
to dichotomize the ‘local’ and ‘international’ and see ‘hybrid’ PSBI outcomes as 
accommodations between these poles. We argue that this approach cannot accurately describe 
the politics of international intervention in target societies, nor can it explain which 
institutions actually emerge or to whose benefit.      
In the peacebuilding literature, ‘hybridity’ denotes how 
 
local actors attempt to respond to, resist and ultimately reshape peace initiatives 
through interactions with international actors and institutions... hybrid forms of peace 
arise when the strategies, institutions and norms of international, largely liberal-
democratic peacebuilding interventions collide with the everyday practices and 
agencies of local actors affected by conflict (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 8, 33).  
 
Hybridity is thus ‘a state of affairs in which liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors 
coexist’ (Belloni, 2012: 22, also Mac Ginty, 2011, Boege et al., 2009). It emerges because of 
a ‘gap’ (Belloni, 2012: 23), or ‘agonism’ (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 26) between the 
agendas of ‘liberal’ international interveners and those of ‘non-liberal’ target societies.  
 Scholars often suggest that ‘hybrid’ outcomes, being more locally legitimate, create 
greater stability (Chopra and Hohe, 2004, Boege et al., 2009, Belloni, 2012: 35, Kumar and 
De la Haye, 2012). For some, hybridity is even potentially ‘emancipatory’, though critical 
scholars doubt that interveners can simply harness local agency towards predictable or 
desirable ends (Millar, 2014, Visoka, 2012, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015).  
 Before its adoption in peacebuilding, ‘hybridity’ was already widely used, especially 
in cultural and postcolonial studies, where it eventually prompted an ‘anti-hybridity backlash’ 
(Pieterse, 2001). Peacebuilding scholars therefore attempted to avoid well-recognized pitfalls, 
particularly accusations that hybridity depends upon, and thus reifies, prior, ‘pure’ social 
categories and identities. They thus strongly deny that hybridity essentializes or dichotomizes 
the international/local distinction, or romanticizes ‘local’ institutions and norms. For 
example, Mac Ginty (2011: 8) argues that, rather than denoting the grafting together of two 
separate entities, hybridity is a process resting on ‘prior hybridity’ – ‘a long history of 
interaction, fusion, competition, resistance and coalescence’. The liberal peace project and its 
advocates, themselves products of prior hybridization, attempt to influence ‘already 
hybridised environments that have experienced civil war or authoritarianism. Further 
hybridisation ensues as (the already hybrid) local and international interact, conflict and 
cooperate’ (Mac Ginty, 2011: 8). Likewise, Boege et al. (2009: 15) state: ‘there are no clear-
cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous “modern” and the endogenous 
“customary”; instead processes of assimilation, articulation, transformation and/or adoption 
are at the interface of the global/exogenous and the local/indigenous’. Hybridity scholars thus 
repeatedly disavow binaries like ‘local’/‘international’, ‘western’/‘non-western’, or 
‘modern’/‘customary’, emphasizing their interaction instead (Peterson, 2012: 12, also Mac 
Ginty, 2010: 397). Similarly, they claim that the ‘local’ is ‘neither monolithic nor necessarily 
incompatible with liberal norms’ (Belloni, 2012: 23, Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 11, Mac 
Ginty and Richmond, 2013).  
However, as Heathershaw (2013: 277) rightly notes, despite thus being ‘caveated to 
the point of defensiveness’, in practice, hybridity accounts still rely ‘on the bifurcation 
between ideal-types of local-indigenous and international-liberal’ (see also Hirblinger and 
Simons, 2015: 424). Thus, Boege et al.’s (2009: 15) above-quoted rejection of some binaries 
is immediately undermined by the presentation of another binary: the ‘global/exogenous and 
the local/indigenous’. Moreover, they follow their caveat by stating that, ‘Nevertheless, the 
use of the terms “custom,” “customary institutions,” and so on is helpful because they expose 
specific local indigenous characteristics that distinguish them from introduced institutions 
that belong to the realm of the state and civil society.’ Similarly, Mac Ginty {, 2010 
#3185@397`, 391}, states that ‘hybridity move[s] us away from the binary combinations... 
[like] modern versus traditional, Western versus non-Western, legal-rational versus 
ritualistic-irrational’, yet immediately reinstates the international/local binary in defining  
 
Hybrid peace [as] the result of the interplay of... the compliance [and] incentivizing 
powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; [and] the ability of local 
actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace interventions... [and to] present and 
maintain alternative forms of peacemaking. 
 Essentializing binaries abound when ‘hybridity’ is used to explain particular cases, 
with careful caveats frequently discarded. In East Timor, for example: Hohe (2002) describes 
a ‘clash of paradigms’ between the ‘Western-style paradigm of statebuilding’ and ‘resilient 
traditional structures’ (also Chopra and Hohe, 2004: 289); Wallis (2012) charts the merging 
of the ‘liberal’ with the ‘local’; Grenfell (2008: 90, also Hicks, 2012) distinguishes between 
the donor-dominated ‘state, as a modern institutional form of governance’ and ‘tribal-
traditional’ governance; and Freire and Lopes (2013) dichotomize ‘local dynamics’ and 
‘external intervention’.   
This misleading reliance on false dichotomies is intrinsic to the hybridity concept. As 
Visoka (2012: 25, quoting Canclini) states, hybridization is ‘a process whereby “discrete 
structures or practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate new 
structures, objects and practices”’. Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, then, 
hybridity as a concept is inherently ‘based on the existence of two oppositional and 
apparently dialectically related forces’ (Heathershaw, 2013: 277). This is why, despite being 
constantly disclaimed, binaries are always reinstated. 
This dichotomizing approach generates weak descriptions and explanations of PSBI 
outcomes. Contrary to commonplace discussions of clashing ‘local’ and ‘international’ 
paradigms, Henrizi (2015) shows how ‘local’ Iraqi women’s NGOs co-opted ‘international’ 
spaces to resist attempts by other ‘locals’ to reimpose strict patriarchy. Similarly, in Burundi, 
international statebuilders promoted the decentralization of conflict-resolution to ‘traditional’, 
‘local’ institutions, but this was resisted by the national government which instead promoted 
local ‘hill councils’ (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015: 430-34). Likewise, as our case study 
shows, ‘local’ East Timorese society was neither devoid of liberal or democratic practices nor 
characterized by uniform adherence to mysticism and tribal authorities. It is highly variegated 
and conflict-ridden, with certain social groups supporting, and others opposing, the 
restoration of ‘local’ and  ‘traditional’ values and structures. Some villagers, particularly 
youths and women, enthusiastically allied with ‘internationals’ to seize resources and 
authority from local patriarchs (Ospina and Hohe, 2001: 115, 109, 16, 93, 138–142, 153, 
117–20). Similarly, despite protesting UN disregard of ‘local’ wishes, the Timorese leaders 
of the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT) willingly joined a cabinet-style 
‘co-governance model’ (Chopra, 2000: 31-33), using it as a launch-pad to create a highly 
centralized national state, angering many sub-national elites. Clearly, the dynamics shaping 
PSBIs’ outcomes are not reducible to ‘local’ resistance to ‘international’ projects. Rather, 
actors located at diverse territorial scales forge alliances to pursue their interests and 
normative agendas. Resorting to awkward categorisations of ‘local locals’ and ‘international 
locals’, as some hybridity scholars do (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013), does not explain 
these alliances or PSBI outcomes; it merely recycles (supposedly discarded) dichotomies. 
Another, related drawback of hybridity’s dichotomizing approach is the tendency 
merely to categorise PSBI outcomes as accommodations between the ‘local’ and 
‘international’. For instance, Mac Ginty (2011), hybridity’s most sophisticated proponent, 
argues that the ‘degree of hybridity’ reflects the ‘balance’ between two forces: liberal peace 
actors’ compulsory and inducement powers, and local actors’ capacities to resist, subvert or 
substitute alternative projects. The trend is towards ever-more-detailed categorisations of 
outcomes along this binary spectrum, by developing taxonomies (e.g. Belloni, 2012, Mac 
Ginty, 2010, Mac Ginty, 2011, Richmond and Mitchell, 2012), and/or identifying processes, 
types, ‘levels’ and ‘degrees’ of hybridization (Mac Ginty, 2010, Wallis, 2012, Visoka, 2012, 
Millar, 2014). Yet such descriptions tell us very little about the institutions established. Why 
did particular institutions emerge, not others? How do they actually function, and to whose 
benefit? ‘Hybridity’ cannot answer these questions. As some proponents admit, hybrid 
outcomes may be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ for ‘subalterns’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015), 
yet the hybridity framework cannot explain why.  
 
BEYOND HYBRIDITY: THE POLITICS OF SCALE 
This section outlines an alternative framework for explaining the institutional outcomes of 
PSBIs. We argue these outcomes are determined by struggles for power and resources 
between coalitions of socio-political forces. Crucially, this includes a politics of scale: a 
struggle to define the authority and resources distributed across and controlled at different 
territorial tiers From this perspective, claims about ‘local’ customs and practices do not 
simply reflect deeply entrenched traditional values that conflict with liberal-international 
ones. They express the mobilization of ideological discourses of ‘locality’ and ‘tradition’ 
intended to promote scalar arrangements favourable to particular societal groups. Nor do 
these claims necessarily involve ‘local’ actors confronting ‘international’ ones. Just as 
international interveners seek local allies, indigenous actors based in villages all the way up 
to the national capital can also pursue principled or tactical alliances with international actors 
to advance or resist governance projects, in line with their interests and values. What emerges 
in practice, then, is not simply to be described as a local-international ‘hybrid’, but is 
explained as product of conflict between social groups struggling to determine order in target 
states, including by constructing scales and modes of governance where their interests will 
prevail.  
 Our starting point is to recognize that, since they typically seek to (re)build 
institutions, PSBIs usually involve considerable socio-political contestation. Institutions – 
especially those connected to state power – (re)allocate power, resources and political 
opportunity structures. Consequently, social forces – classes and class fractions, distributional 
coalitions, state-based, ethnic, confessional and other groupings – typically seek to shape 
them in ways favourable to their own interests and agendas (Poulantzas, 1976, Jessop, 2008).  
 This contestation typically involves a strong ‘scalar’ dimension. In political 
geography, ‘scale’ denotes a territorial space in which social, political and economic relations 
are contested. Scales may reflect existing political ‘tiers’ within a state – a village, a province, 
or ‘the nation’ – or cut across them, like ‘bio-regions’, ‘transgovernmental networks’ or ‘the 
global’. Scales, including the national territorial scale, are not natural; they are (re)produced 
through strategic agency and socio-political contestation. The scalar arrangement of political 
life is contested because, much like institutions, different scales involve different 
configurations of actors, power, resources and political opportunity structures. Shifting scales 
– rescaling – changes these configurations, potentially changing political outcomes (Gough, 
2004). For example, Gibson (2013) shows how authoritarian subnational elites strive to keep 
issues ‘local’, since at this scale their interests prevail. Conversely, their local opponents 
often try to transform issues into ‘national’ matters, since they can find more allies and 
resources at this scale to defeat local strongmen. Both of these are subnational groups, but 
their scalar strategies and the alliances they pursue differ markedly because of their diverging 
interests. Similarly, ‘scale jumping’ to a regional or global scale is used by many socio-
political groups. ‘Territorial politics’ is a common and intrinsic part of political life, even if 
actors do not think explicitly in terms of ‘scale’ (Brenner and Elden, 2009). 
As Hirblinger and Simons (2015: 425-6) argue, scalar politics are particularly 
apparent in the contestation of PSBIs because the institutions being created always involve a 
scalar (re)allocation of authority and resources. Interventions aiming to regulate budgetary 
processes to prevent corruption by political and bureaucratic elites, for example, may 
undermine the capacity of elites dominating the national scale to use these resources to 
support their power. However, such intervention could well be supported by these elites’ 
‘local’ rivals. Likewise, efforts to support local courts or customary peacemaking processes 
have an important scalar dimension, because they allocate resources and power to particular 
actors at a subnational scale, such as villages or districts. This could be resisted by actors at 
these scales, or the national scale, fearing the empowerment of rival groups. 
In analyzing this contestation, crucially, political geographers do not reify or 
dichotomize scales and associated sets of actors. This contrasts with the hybridity 
scholarship, which draws stark divisions between ‘local’ and ‘international’ actors, assuming 
‘locals’ will resist ‘international’ agendas given their intrinsically illiberal or traditional 
preferences for ‘local’ modes of governance. For political geographers, whether actors 
support governance projects at the level of a village, district, province, nation, region or the 
planet is not simply determined by their physical or cultural location. More important are the 
implications of differently-scaled governance arrangements for actors’ power, resources, 
interests and ideological agendas. Where a given scaled mode of governance is potentially 
favourable to a particular group, we would expect it to support the intervention or seek to 
adapt it for their purposes; where it is deleterious, we would anticipate resistance. 
Accordingly, different ‘locals’, even those co-located in a given spatial setting, will 
potentially have very different attitudes to specific PSBI projects, generating complex, multi-
scalar alliances and contestation. For example, a ‘local’ male village elder may favour moves 
by international statebuilders to restore the traditional powers of rural community leaders. 
However, ‘local’ youths and women in the same village, fearing renewed repression, may 
resist this and instead favour the emergence of strong national-scale powers more favourable 
to their own liberation. They may be supported by national-level political elites seeking to 
strengthen their authority against subnational challengers, who may in turn solicit other PSBI 
projects that will achieve this end (for examples, see case study below and Hirblinger and 
Simons, 2015, Henrizi, 2015, Visoka, 2012).  
Thus, a politics of scale approach does not simply substitute a local/international 
contest for a struggle ‘between’ scales, because scales – and the actors, institutions, identities 
and so on often depicted as entrenched at them – are not fixed. Rather, PSBI outcomes are 
shaped by a struggle about scale: they involve conflict over how power, resources and 
authority should be allocated to (prospective) institutions at different territorial tiers. From 
this perspective, claims about the value or otherwise of ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ governance 
arrangements are just that – claims, mobilized as part of a ‘purposeful’ struggle to advance 
‘specific political agendas’ (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015: 425, 423). This clearly includes 
hybridity scholars promoting ‘positive hybridisations’ that emancipate ‘subalterns’ while 
constraining ‘elites’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015, see Randazzo, 2016).  
Explaining PSBI outcomes – what institutions emerge, why, and to whose benefit – 
thus involves three analytical steps. First, we identify the main social forces contesting state 
power in a given territory, including the interveners. We need to understand the dominant 
axes of conflict between these groups, and the interests, resources, agendas and strategies 
they have at the time of the intervention. Note that it is these concrete groups of human 
actors, situated in particular political economy and social power relationships, that contest 
PSBIs by trying to (re)produce particular scales and scalar modes of governance. ‘Scales’ are 
contested; they are structures of political space, not ‘actors’; thus ‘scales’ in themselves 
cannot ‘contest’ anything – only actors can contest, construct or undermine scales and 
associated modes of governance. Secondly, we focus on a particular PSBI project or area and 
identify how this relates to the interests and agendas of the main social groups. This relatively 
narrow focus is important because, as indicated above, a given group may simultaneously 
support one PSBI initiative yet resist another, depending on how it affects them or their allies. 
To reiterate, we must not presuppose that actors, whether located at the scale of a village, a 
province, a state, or an international organisation, have any intrinsic preference for a given 
scale or mode of governance. It is categorically not the case that ‘indigenous’ people (or 
‘local locals’ as Richmond and Mac Ginty call them) like traditional, village-scale 
governance while only ‘internationals’ (or ‘international locals’) favour ‘national’ and 
‘liberal’ governance. Depending on their interests and ideologies, some villagers could 
support a strong national state, while certain international peacebuilders favour localised 
governance.  
The third step is to analyze the coalitions and contestations flowing from this 
configuration of interests and agendas. It is this contestation that, ultimately, determines what 
institutions emerge, how they function, and to whose benefit. PSBI outcomes are thus a 
function of inter-scalar conflicts between actors endowed with different levels of power and 
resources. Again, this may involve complex, tactical, multi-scalar alliances between actors 
that may ostensibly share little in common. For example, Cambodia’s highly corrupt ruling 
party has worked closely with foreign donors promoting ‘good governance’ to forge a 
national-international scale of governance in development policy, since this allows it to 
marginalize domestic opponents (Hameiri, 2010: 177-207). Meanwhile, in East Timor, World 
Bank statebuilders sought to construct ‘local’ and ‘liberal’ modes of governance that, while 
embraced by many women and younger men, are contested by traditional chiefs fearing a loss 
of power, by national-level elites favouring a centralization of authority, and by UN-based 
statebuilders (Ospina and Hohe, 2001).  
We can identify three basic types of strategic responses to PSBIs by actors in target 
states. First, elites dominating the national scale might try to completely resist PSBI 
programs. Because PSBIs do not usurp target states’ formal sovereignty, they require 
recipient governments’ cooperation. Accordingly, elites with access to national-level state 
agencies may invoke sovereignty and non-interference norms to reject interventions they 
dislike; they thus retain a key role as ‘scale managers’ (Peck, 2002: 340). However, the total 
rejection of foreign assistance is rare, since the resources interveners offer are typically 
attractive for embattled governments in poor countries. A second, more common response, 
then, is the attempted use of the state’s ‘scale management’ function to selectively admit or 
constrain donor programs in ways that bolster national-scale elites’ authority and control over 
resources. A third possibility is ‘localization’. Subnational actors, or even weaker nationally 
based actors, seeking to contest the national scale’s dominance may attempt to harness PSBI 
programs – particularly if they involve attempts to fragment the national scale and curtail 
dominant national-level elites’ authority – to shift authority and resources downwards. These 
efforts often emphasise the legitimacy of modes of governance based in ‘organic’, 
‘traditional’ communities, in contrast to ‘imported’ institutions like the state, to support 
demands that ‘the local’ should enjoy increased autonomy and resource allocation. Whether 
these efforts succeed depends on the nature of the forces in struggle, their power, resources, 
organization and strategy. Our perspective does not disregard the agency of ‘subaltern’ or 
marginalized groups, but departs from the normative commitment to uncovering the 
‘everyday’ found in some branches of the hybridity literature. Their agency matters for us to 
the extent these groups are able to affect the distribution of power and resources. Though we 
recognize that non-elite groups could, mainly through alliances with more powerful actors, 
sometimes successfully shape governance and political outcomes to their desired ends, given 
power imbalances it is likely their capacity to do so will be limited and their achievements 
rather modest. 
 
EAST TIMOR 
East Timor clearly demonstrates hybridity’s shortcomings and the utility of a framework 
foregrounding social conflict and scalar politics. After 450 years of Portuguese colonialism 
and 25 years of brutal Indonesian occupation, East Timor voted for independence in 1999. 
The Indonesian army and its allied Timorese militias destroyed 70 per cent of the territory’s 
buildings and infrastructure and forcibly displaced most of the population as they withdrew, 
precipitating a humanitarian crisis. International peacekeepers were deployed, followed by 
the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) statebuilding mission. 
UNTAET’s failure to establish a stable liberal democracy was attributed to the clash between 
its liberal project and local-traditional institutions, generating the earliest calls for hybridized 
governance. However, the politics of statebuilding in East Timor simply does not correspond 
to this analysis. Rather, post-conflict East Timor was a society in flux, with severe vertical 
and horizontal divisions revealed as groups struggled for power and resources. Different 
groups, located at different territorial scales, selectively embraced, contested or rejected 
international intervention depending on their interests and agendas. The outcome reflects 
these struggles. The Timorese state today expresses a contingent accommodation between 
elites dominating the national scale seeking to centralize power and resources in their hands, 
and village-level leaders who have received limited concessions binding them into a 
subordinate relationship to the national scale.  
 East Timor is a crucial test case for our argument because it is the case par excellence 
for the hybridity approach. Scholars widely assert that UNTAET’s failures reflect a ‘clash of 
paradigms’ between liberal-international statebuilders and the ‘tribal-traditional’ Timorese, 
producing an ‘empty shell’ state (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, Hohe, 2002, Grenfell, 2008). This 
diagnosis, notwithstanding caveats like those discussed above, is strongly dichotomous. As 
one typical account puts it, there are ‘two polities’ in a ‘disjunctive relationship’: ‘One model, 
based on Western values... is that of the nation-state. The other is that of the adat [customary 
law] and comprises indigenous values’ (Cummins, 2015: 34, Hicks, 2012: 26, see also 
Brown, 2012: 54). The vast majority of Timorese are said to live simple lives in rural villages 
(sucos) where ‘their only experience [is] of customary governance’, i.e., social organization 
based around ‘sacred houses’ (uma lisan) and rule by local kings (liurai) and/or traditional 
village elders, according to mythic principles and customary law (adat/ lisan). By ignoring 
this, UNAET entrenched a ‘major “gap” between government decision-makers and... people 
in the villages’ (Cummins, 2015: 34, 38). This generated calls for ‘hybridized’ international-
liberal/local-traditional peacebuilding (Chopra and Hohe, 2004, Hicks, 2012, Freire and 
Lopes, 2013). Policymakers appear to have embraced these recommendations, leading some 
to identify East Timor as a paradigmatic case of successful hybrid peacebuilding (Wallis, 
2012, Richmond, 2011). 
 As we show, this is descriptively inaccurate and fails to explain the specific form 
taken by the Timorese state. Decentralization and other concessions to local-traditional 
governance remain modest compared to other Austronesian societies. There is, for example, 
no parallel to Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs or Papua New Guinea’s village courts system, 
which formally entrench traditional authorities and laws in day-to-day governance. Nor are 
customary land claims legally recognized, as in Solomon Islands. Merely emphasizing a 
hybridization process and describing the outcome as hybrid does not explain why East Timor 
has not developed such institutions, nor why it has developed others. Our framework can 
account for these outcomes.   
We must first disaggregate the ‘local’ to identify the forces contesting state power. 
Such systematic analysis is absent in hybridity scholarship, which prefers to gloss over 
divisions and discuss attitudes ‘in general’.3 The most important social cleavages can be 
summarized as ‘horizontal’ divisions within villages, and ‘vertical’, inter-scalar divisions 
between village-level and national-level Timorese elites.  
Rather than being domains of universally accepted custom, many Timorese villages 
are deeply conflict-ridden. In many settlements, especially in urban and peri-urban areas and 
around agricultural plantations, colonialism and Catholicism have profoundly eroded the 
authority of liurais and other chiefs, with adat being entirely supplanted by state and clerical 
authority (Mearns, 2002: 53), and modern class relations emerging (Belun, 2013, Nixon, 
2013: 165-166, da Costa Magno and Coa, 2012). Accordingly, far from a ‘gap’ between the 
state and villages, there is frequently a ‘customary authority gap’ within villages (Meitzner 
Yoder, 2007: 52), such that claims about elders’ traditional authority are actually conscious 
efforts at the ‘revitalisation of custom and tradition’, the ‘reinstatement’ of something long-
since eroded (Palmer, 2011: 153). Elders are naturally interested in restoring their traditional 
powers over other community members, particularly in relation to the control of land. 
Traditionally, land in East Timor is claimed communally by uma lulik, with elders 
determining its distribution and use within lulik guidelines. This underpins one of the most 
important ‘horizontal’ divisions within villages, between houses claiming to be ‘original’ 
settlers, and thereby authorized to determine land use, and ‘newcomers’, who – according to 
lulik – may only occupy and use land with the former’s permission, even if they have lived 
there for centuries. Given the massive forced displacements under colonialism, and because 
most Timorese are subsistence farmers, this is a highly significant form of social power. In 
the extreme societal flux following Indonesia’s departure, many local chiefs revived long-
                                                          
3 Cummins (2015) is an excellent example. Despite an entire chapter recounting how Timorese village life was 
already ‘hybridized’ by 1999 by experiences of Portuguese and Indonesian colonialism, Catholicism and 
capitalism, Cummins nonetheless reverts to the dichotomous presentations already cited above. Similarly, 
despite occasional recognitions that certain groups – notably women, youths and national political leaders – 
reject traditional attitudes (pp. 48, 57, 85-91, 110-111), Cummins still insists that lisan is ‘central to people’s 
lives’ (p. 44), ‘every’ Timorese favours its retention (p.47), ‘in general, customary authorities are well-respected 
and their roles are actively relied upon’ (p. 104), etc. 
dormant traditional land claims as part of a widespread struggle for scarce resources, while 
‘newcomers’ have resisted (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012).  
Other important ‘horizontal’ divisions are gender and age-related. Although uma lulik 
are sometimes matrilineal, men typically predominate, with lulik assigning women a very 
subordinate role. Domestic violence is widespread. Unsurprisingly, ample evidence shows 
that many Timorese women resent their patriarchal subordination. They have invoked their 
active role in the anti-Indonesian resistance and sought international allies to combat the re-
traditionalization of gender relations (Niner, 2011: 276, Cummins, 2015: 85-91, Braithwaite 
et al., 2012). Finally, lulik also subordinates young Timorese men. For some of them, 
independence and democracy offer an avenue for greater socio-political equality; conversely, 
‘many of the[m]... [regard] tradition as something that takes them backwards’ (da Costa 
Magno and Coa, 2012: 174). 
While neglecting the aforementioned ‘horizontal’ divisions, hybridity scholars 
frequently invoke the ‘vertical’ division between village chiefs and national-level Timorese 
elites. Here there is a typical ambiguity: the local/international dichotomy sits uneasily with 
the fact that national-level Timorese elites – who are undeniably ‘locals’ – were heavily 
involved in UNTAET’s statebuilding project. Given the need to dichotomize within a 
hybridity framework, the tendency is to implicitly categorize them as ‘international’ by 
emphasizing that many were former exiles who shared UNTAET’s ‘misperception’ of East 
Timor ‘as a tabula rasa’ (Braithwaite et al., 2012: 114), and shared its disregard for ‘local’ 
practices (Wallis, 2012: 752). This is unsatisfactory. Although high-profile exiles did ascend 
to leadership positions, many CNRT leaders had never left East Timor, and were as deeply 
rooted in ‘local’ society as any village chief. The CNRT’s leader and UNTAET’s main 
collaborator, Xanana Gusmão, had led the armed resistance in Timor’s forests for a decade. 
The CNRT was intimately linked to a territory-wide clandestine network that incorporated 
many village chiefs and became the main organizational base for the political party that won 
the first post-independence elections, FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independente) (Jones, 2010: 554-562). Rather than depicting Timorese national elites as 
naive outsiders, it is more persuasive to analyze them as groups struggling for power and 
resources, both amongst themselves (another ‘horizontal’ division), and against rival 
claimants from lower territorial scales (‘vertical’ conflict). Indeed, this is a very longstanding 
conflict: FRETLIN’s 1975 programme for independence involved stripping local elders – 
who were collaborators of the Portuguese colonial authorities – of their powers, causing 
many to side with FRETILIN’s opponents. After 1999, liurais again sought to preserve their 
privileges, agitating for a ‘Council of Liurais’ to advise state officials (Wallis, 2012: 755). 
This idea was promoted by the KOTA and PPT parties, which were heavily based among 
village-level elites (Cummins, 2015: 37), and pushed again after East Timor was convulsed 
by political violence in 2006 (Trindade, 2008). Coupled with traditional leaders’ claims to 
control land and natural resources, and their insistence that their role in the resistance is a 
‘blood debt’ requiring repayment (Butterworth and Dale, 2011: 7), this comprises a 
significant bid for power and authority from ‘below’. It represents a challenge to national-
scale elites whose legitimacy and power derive primarily from electoral, not traditional, 
processes,4 and who – most importantly – typically seek to centralize control over resources 
at the national scale to consolidate their own position. Revealingly, resistance to conceding 
significant power and authority to village leaders is shared across the political spectrum, as 
we shall see. 
We can now investigate how these power struggles have shaped the results of 
international intervention in three periods: UNTAET (1999-2002); the FRETILIN 
government (2002-2006); and the Alianca Maioria de Parlamentar (AMP) coalition 
government (2007-present). We focus on governmental decentralization and land policies to 
crystallize the politics of scale involved. A similar focus by Hirblinger and Simon (2015) in 
their African case studies generated strong findings. 
 
UNTAET 
Under UNTAET, CNRT elites dominating the national scale harnessed their emerging ‘scale 
management’ function to ensure that international intervention centralized power and 
resources and promoted forms of decentralization that marginalized village chiefs (Hughes, 
2012). UNTAET’s statebuilding project favoured their centralizing vision, since it was a 
classic ‘liberal peace’ operation, seeking to construct a national state, hold elections and 
withdraw. UNTAET involved little decentralization: governance projects focused on the 
national, district and sub-district scales, neglecting the sucos. As UNTAET’s main 
interlocutor, the CNRT leveraged demands for ‘local’ participation to establish itself as the 
core of a ‘cabinet’. Gusmão, in particular, exploited this to pack the emerging security 
apparatus with his followers, while the CNRT’s constituent parties positioned themselves to 
win the 2002 elections (Jones, 2010: 554-562). Importantly, the CNRT vetoed UN proposals 
to establish a land claims commission, thereby ensuring that land (re)distribution would be 
                                                          
4 While some national politicians come from regionally-based, chiefly families, their claims to nationwide 
authority are electorally based. 
left for them to determine (Fitzpatrick, 2002: ch. 1). This served national-level elites’ 
purposes in general, and the specific interests of leaders who had acquired large landholdings 
under colonialism: the infrastructure minister who seized control of UNTAET’s Land and 
Property Unit and then rendered it defunct was Joao Carrascalão, scion of East Timor’s most 
powerful landed family (Braithwaite et al., 2012: 120). 
The only significant decentralization initiative under UNTAET rule – the World 
Bank’s Community Empowerment Project (CEP) – was shaped by both horizontal and 
vertical social conflicts. CEP involved holding suco elections for village development 
councils comprising one male and one female representative, which then formed sub-district-
level CEP councils tasked with distributing US$10-20,000 (later US$25-75,000) for 
rehabilitation projects in their areas. CEP is widely regarded as a failure, including by the 
World Bank, because local chiefs and elders were deliberately disqualified from election. 
Thus, the councils, apparently based on international-liberal principles, ‘suffered from a lack 
of local legitimacy’ and ‘could not compete with the authority exercised by [customary] 
leaders’ (Cummins, 2015: 35-36, see Ospina and Hohe, 2001).  
However, CEP actually resists neat categorization as ‘international’. The project 
engaged directly with ‘local’ governance; recruited ‘local’ participants, many highly 
enthusiastic; was advised by ‘national’ CNRT elites; and experienced strong opposition from 
the ‘international’ UNTAET (Totilo, 2009: 76-83). The decision to exclude traditional elders 
from CEP elections was taken because CNRT leaders insisted that village chiefs should not 
be re-empowered (Totilo, 2009: 80). Thus, East Timor’s emerging inter-scalar power struggle 
is fundamental to explaining the form taken by decentralization. Furthermore, CEP’s 
outcomes cannot be understood without considering horizontal power struggles. 
Understandably, given the resources at stake in conditions of extreme scarcity, ‘original’ and 
‘newcomer’ settlements contested the definition of village boundaries for electoral purposes 
(Ospina and Hohe, 2001: 120). Where ‘newcomers’ controlled CEP councils and directed 
resources into projects benefiting their community, their neighbours sabotaged their work 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2012: ch. 6). Conversely, where original groups seized control, tribal elders 
could influence them to prosecute land disputes against their neighbours, reasserting their 
‘traditional’ rights (Ospina and Hohe, 2001: 117-120). Where traditional governance had 
been eroded, election to CEP structures also provided an avenue for women’s representation, 
and ‘a tool for the young people to express their wishes and revolt against the traditional 
powers’ (Ospina and Hohe, 2001: 115, also Cummins, 2015: 51). Unsurprisingly, customary 
leaders fought back, often managing to dominate the councils informally (Ospina and Hohe, 
2001: 127-142). Notwithstanding their invocations of ‘tradition’, this was not a clash between 
the ‘local’ and the ‘liberal’, but rather a mobilization of ideological discourse to uphold 
particular social power relations. As Hicks (2012: 36) inadvertently notes, village chiefs 
defended ‘an adat in which women and young men have less status’ precisely because under 
the ‘new order’ these groups’ positions are ‘radicalised... they [can] now take their seats at 
the heart of suku authority’. Where elders have managed to capture democratic institutions, 
their complaints about violations of tradition are, correspondingly, far more muted (da Costa 
Magno and Coa, 2012: 170).  
 
FRETILIN Rule 
Under FRETILIN, statebuilding was predominantly shaped by horizontal struggles among 
elites at the national scale, following the CNRT’s dissolution into its constituent parties, and 
vertical conflict between national and traditional village authorities, which continued to 
produce highly constrained forms of decentralization. After winning the 2002 elections, 
FRETILIN moved rapidly to consolidate power and control over resources at the national 
scale. The FRETILIN-dominated constitutional assembly created a centralized parliamentary 
regime, merging FRETILIN party symbols into the state, and instituted a proportional 
representation system that gave national leaders control over candidate selection in 
subnational elections. FRETILIN also made Portuguese East Timor’s official language, a 
move broadly supported by Timor’s Lusophone, national-level elites, but resented by youths 
speaking Indonesian and rural leaders speaking indigenous languages (Jones, 2010: 560-561). 
Far from an irrational act, as often suggested, this was a deliberate move to coalesce state 
power in the hands of older elites at the national scale (Braithwaite et al., 2012: 114).  
FRETILIN’s cautious moves towards decentralization after 2003 were shaped by a 
desire to extend the party and state’s functional reach without ceding power to traditional 
village authorities. Again violating local/international distinctions, it pursued this agenda with 
the UN through a joint Local Development Programme (LDP) from 2004. This reflected a 
general shift in external statebuilding agendas away from merely establishing liberal national 
institutions towards promoting the decentralization of governance and economic 
opportunities. But again, national-scale elites adapted this thrust for their own ends. 
FRETILIN instituted elections for aldeia chiefs and for suco chiefs and councils. These 
essentially adapted the CEP model – controversial among traditional elders – by requiring 
suco councils to include two women and two youths alongside the suco and aldeia chiefs. 
However, the councils’ role was limited to planning, implementing and monitoring 
development projects (Butterworth and Dale, 2011: 1, 7-8). Real governmental authority and, 
crucially, budget control was allocated to the sub-districts, which were to be converted into 
elected municipal councils, while the districts would be abolished. The municipalities would 
be immune from capture by traditional elites, whose influence was limited to individual 
villages. Conversely, as the country’s best-organized political party below the national level 
(Kingsbury, 2012: 194), FRETILIN could expect reasonable success in municipal elections. 
This mode of decentralization thus deliberately left elites at the village scale dependent on 
resource disbursements from higher governmental tiers, whose personnel would be elected 
from party lists determined in Dili. Unsurprisingly, in the 2005-2006 suco elections, many 
candidates aligned themselves with FRETILIN, seeing this as the best way to get resources 
for their villages (Cummins and Leach, 2012: 176). 
FRETILIN’s land policy was similarly concerned to centralize resource control and 
prevent the revitalization of customary authorities, including through using the state’s ‘scale 
management’ function to selectively embrace international initiatives. In 2003, parliament 
passed Law 1/2003 on the regulation of state and abandoned land, which asserted state 
ownership of all land except where private title could be proven. The law recognized no 
customary land rights and empowered the national Land and Property Directorate to 
adjudicate claims. In 2005, USAID drafted a law on private land that proposed a more 
restitutionary approach, recognized customary claims and permitted the use of traditional 
procedures to resolve land disputes. While welcomed by many elites at the village scale, the 
draft law was resisted by nationally dominant elites. It not only risked re-empowering sub-
national leaders at their expense, but might also unleash a wave of evictions as traditional 
land-holders reasserted their rights over newcomers. Given the massive population 
displacement and subsequent land and property grabs that had only recently occurred, this 
could foment serious social unrest. Exercising the state’s scale management function, the 
Ministry of Justice rejected USAID’s proposals. It instead commissioned Brazilian legal 
advisors to produce a new draft, which excised all discussion of custom, providing for 
‘communal’ land use only with state approval. ‘Traditional institutions’ were given the right 
to participate in, but not veto, natural resource exploitation, decisions over which were 
reserved for the central government (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012: ch. 5).  
 
AMP Rule 
The AMP government’s decentralization and land policies reflected the same underlying 
power struggles. Accordingly, despite some concessions to village-scale elites, power and 
resource control remain highly centralized. The AMP’s primary concern was to restore socio-
political stability and marginalize FRETILIN following the internecine violence of 2006, 
which toppled the FRETILIN administration and precipitated the return of international 
peacekeepers. It did so primarily through distributing patronage financed by oil exports, 
revenues from which had not been available to FRETILIN. By handing cash, subsidies and 
government contracts to those capable of creating violent disorder, the AMP solidified its 
shaky coalition and popular support, at the expense of entrenching ‘rampant’ government 
corruption (Kingsbury, 2014: 185, Nixon, 2013: 159). Perhaps unwittingly, the PSBI present 
during this period, UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT, 2006-2012), supported 
this political consolidation. Reflecting the broader, post-Iraq trend to favour stabilization over 
liberalization, UNMIT’s main objectives were to suppress violent political conflict, promote 
security sector reform, and provide security around elections. The earlier focus on 
decentralization waned significantly, making it even easier for the AMP to pick and choose 
international allies who would support their interests. 
The AMP’s approach to the ‘traditional’ reflected attempts to co-opt village chiefs 
into its patronage networks by making institutional and material concessions that nonetheless 
reaffirmed the centre’s grip. The 2007-12 AMP programme ostensibly promised to 
decentralize authority and resources ‘in strict partnership with traditional administration’ 
(Cummins and Leach, 2012: 165). In 2009, the FRETILIN-dominated sub-districts were 
abolished, leaving the districts and sucos as East Timor’s main sub-national governmental 
tiers. To eradicate FRETILIN’s local influence and restore social peace, political party 
affiliations were banned in suco elections. While the quota systems for women and youth 
remained, entire councils were now to be elected as slates selected by suco chiefs, enabling 
dominant local elites to recapture local governance en bloc, and thereby re-subordinate 
women and youths (Brown, 2012: 66-67). Chiefs were also permitted to co-opt lia-na’in – 
keepers of ‘traditional knowledge’ – onto their councils, enabling them to appoint pliable 
elders who would legitimise their decisions using adat.  
These concessions to traditional authorities are frequently invoked as evidence of 
‘hybridization’, but merely labelling them as such does not explain their limits, in a way that 
the politics of scale can. Notably, villages still do not control resource allocation, which 
remains firmly centralized, as, for example, in the 2009 US$70m ‘Referendum Package’ and 
the 2010 US$44m Decentralized Development Programme, both run out of national 
ministries (Butterworth and Dale, 2011: 8). Reflecting their desire to consolidate power and 
resource control at the national scale, AMP ministers have fiercely resisted any  
decentralization of budgets or authority, limiting district councils’ responsibilities to just 
health and water (Kingsbury, 2012: 268-269, 271 n38). Since financial resources remain a 
gift of elites at the national scale, village leaders are compelled to lobby them for patronage, 
precluding the emergence of serious local challenges to the national scale. Formal allocations 
are supplemented by personalized patronage like Gusmão’s disbursement of US$50,000 to 
each suco in 2010. Designed to boost his party’s standing in the 2012 elections, this was 
highly controversial among other AMP members (Kingsbury, 2012: 269). Meanwhile, 
FRETILIN’s LDP was scaled back to the district level, its budget cut to just US$2.35m. 
Thus, despite concessions to traditional leaders, as a World Bank survey concludes, East 
Timor’s government has shifted from ‘bottom-up, participatory approaches... to a strategy 
that emphasises centralised authority’ (Butterworth and Dale, 2011: 8). 
This trend is even clearer in relation to land. The Land Law drafted in 2012 – again 
with international input – reflects a ‘desire to regulate resources at a national scale’, 
privileging existing occupiers and investors ‘over... customary systems’ (Fitzpatrick et al., 
2012: ch. 1). Yet again, manifesting the use of the state’s ‘scale management’ function, the 
AMP government initially re-invited USAID to generate new land regulations but, when 
these proved unsatisfactory, USAID was dismissed and Portuguese advisors engaged instead. 
The 2012 legislation still assigns the central state power to allocate all land not recognized as 
‘private’. The latter category includes Indonesian or Portuguese titles – unsurprising, perhaps, 
given that another Carrascalão was now deputy prime minister. It also allows pre-2006 
occupancy to override customary claims. This represents a massive concession to 
‘newcomers’, including those who seized land and property after 1999, which they welcomed 
as strengthening their hand vis-à-vis traditional land-holders (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012: ch. 5-6). 
Conversely, the latter complain of being abandoned in favour of violent land-grabbers 
(Cummins, 2015: 83). The land law has also consolidated national-scale control of patronage 
resources, permitting the government to issue large land concessions to investors, generating 
‘persistent allegations of rent-seeking’ and corruption scandals (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012: ch. 
5). 
This pattern also manifests in how state agencies engage with traditional practices. 
Another fact cited as evidence of ‘hybridization’ is the increased use of tara bandu, ‘ruling 
through prohibition’, a traditional method of banning undesirable practices through 
communal negotiations and ritual displays. Ironically, rebutting the international/local binary, 
and reflecting traditional authority’s degradation, tara bandu has been reintroduced in many 
areas by international NGOs, because the practice had ‘been forgotten over time’ (Belun, 
2013: 30). Also violating simplistic traditional/state binaries, village elders typically seek 
state officials’ involvement in tara bandu ceremonies to bolster their withered authority. 
Indeed, they display a ‘marked inability to resolve inter-village disputes, including those 
precipitated as a result of the tara bandu programme itself, without mediation by government 
officials’ (Meitzner Yoder, 2007: 51). Government forestry officials have supported tara 
bandu to enforce bans on logging – which boomed after 1999, including in ‘sacred’ areas 
with the active involvement of traditional authorities – and sand-mining in Dili’s main river 
(Meitzner Yoder, 2007: 45-48, Wallis, 2012: 753). In such cases, there is a confluence of 
interests between local elders seeking assistance to reassert their customary authority, and 
government officials seeking to bolster existing state laws on resource exploitation. Absent 
such confluence, tara bandu is contested or ignored. For example, government officials’ use 
of tara bandu to assert the state’s right to exploit natural resources have been criticized as 
incorrectly following traditional rules and conflicts have emerged over whether to maintain 
plantations or restore them to ‘sacred’ domains (Wallis, 2012: 753, Meitzner Yoder, 2007: 
51). Customary rights are routinely overridden where they clash with large-scale state 
projects as, for example, in the government’s establishment of a massive national park in 
Lautem district, in league with international NGOs (Cullen, 2012). Such outcomes are only 
explicable as struggles for power and resources between actors located at different territorial 
scales. 
Finally, descriptions of ‘hybridity’ cannot explain how East Timor’s revised mode of 
local governance actually functions. In theory, the AMP’s concessions to village elites permit 
their recapture of suco councils. Many hybridity scholars assert that this has occurred fairly 
uniformly,  generating the ‘“re-traditionalisation” of local government’ (Cummins and Leach, 
2012: 170). This has rightly attracted criticism of the negative consequences, particularly for 
women, defying the notion that hybridization yields emancipation (Niner, 2011). However, 
other research suggests a more variegated picture, reflecting the uneven degradation of 
traditional authority and local horizontal social conflicts. Outcomes are ‘highly dependent on 
the local politics, as well as the history of the liurai in the community’ (da Costa Magno and 
Coa, 2012: 167). Many communities, dominated by feudal social relations, have reasserted 
‘their cultural practices for identifying leaders’; elsewhere, however, as during the CEP 
experiment, some seize democratization as ‘an opportunity to exercise their freedom to elect 
their leaders and to be elected, enabling not only those from particular kinship groups to be a 
leader’ (Gusmao, 2012: 182). Thus, just as the degree and nature of decentralization reflects 
inter-scalar power struggles, so village governance reflects local struggles to shape state 
institutions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that ‘hybridity’ is an inadequate framework through which to address 
an undeniably crucial question: how are the outcomes of international interventions shaped 
by socio-political dynamics in target states? Despite claims to the contrary, hybridity 
ultimately reifies and necessarily dichotomizes notions of the ‘local’ and ‘international’, and 
wrongly assumes that PSBI outcomes are driven by interactions between these ill-defined 
entities. This leads to explanations of intervention that emphasize their degree of 
hybridization but typically over-simplify socio-political struggles over governance and in 
whose interests emergent modes of governance function. Conversely, a state-theoretical 
framework foregrounding social conflict and the politics of scale is capable of theorizing how 
PSBIs relate to target-society dynamics and can better explain outcomes. It especially can 
account for any intervention that seeks to (re)allocate power and resources, particularly 
across governance scales. 
 The East Timor case study illustrated this framework’s utility. The politics of state- 
and peace-building here did not reflect simplistic dichotomies between the ‘local/traditional’ 
and the ‘international/liberal’. Rather, it expressed struggles for power and resources between 
actors located at diverse territorial scales, who partnered or fought each other, and embraced 
or rejected ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ principles insofar as this advanced their interests and 
agendas in a broad struggle for power and resources. ‘Local’, village-level governance was 
not simply a domain of tradition and custom that rejected ‘liberal’ intervention, but a conflict-
ridden and variegated scale where interveners found both willing accomplices who would 
benefit from their projects, and entrenched opponents, who would not. Similarly, nationally 
based elites selectively rejected and embraced international governance projects insofar as 
they served their goal of marginalizing traditional leaders’ demands for power and resources 
‘from below’, and centralized control at the national scale, where their interests would 
prevail. The outcome fuses traditional authorities and practices with subnational state 
institutions. Yet, merely labelling this as ‘hybrid’ does not explain the limitations of this 
fusion, or how ‘hybridized’ apparatuses function in practice. Conversely, our framework 
explains these outcomes as the product of both intra- and inter-scalar socio-political 
contestation, and identifies which social forces promote or resist particular modes of 
governance, and to what effect. 
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